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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SECURITY TITLE INSURANCE 
AGENCY, now known as 
SECURITY TITLE 
GUARANTY COMPANY, and 
SECURITY TITLE 
COMPANY, Utah Corporations, Case No. 992'5 
Plaintiffs & Respondents, 
vs. 
SECURITY TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a California 
Corporation, 
Defendant & Appellant. 
PLAINTIFFS' & RE'SPDONDENTS' REPLY TO 
DEFENDANT & APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRIEF. 
INTRODUCTION 
On the 31st day of December, 196'3, this Court 
filed its unanimous opinion affirming the decision 
of the lower Court enjoining appellant from use of 
the words "Security Title" as a part of its name in 
doing business in Utah. The appellant has petitiQned 
this Court for rehearing and filed a brief in support 
thereof. Respondents believe the appellant's peti-
tion to be without merit and, therefore, make the 
following reply thereto. 
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ARGUMENT 
.NPPELLANT'S PETITION FOR R E H E A R I N G 
STATES NO NEW FACTS OR GROUNDS FOR A RE-
VERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT 
AND IS MAINLY A RE-ARGUMENT OF THE CASE. 
THE PE'TITION FOR REHEARING SHOU1JD BE DE-
NIElD. 
Appell:ant sets out two points upon which it 
bases its claim of entitlement to rehearing. Both 
mark a change in emphasis in the appellant's posi-
tion. N ei'ther sets out anything new. The continual 
shifting of position by appellant throughout the 
course of this trial and :appeal is reminiscent of the 
child's toy whicll, when pushed down in one place, 
pops up in another. In appellant's original brief to 
this Court, appellant centered its appeal on alleged 
errors in the lower Court's findings. The three points 
argued by appellant in the original brief were based 
entirely on alleged errors in the findings. Respon-
dent answered the appellant's brief. This occasioned 
a reply by appellant in which no mention is made 
of erroneous findings. The Reply Brief of appellant 
is based upon the premise 1that an essen tia1 element 
of the repondent's entitlement Ito relief is a showing 
that defendant-appellant, by the use of the word "Se-
curity 'Title", created confusion resulting in damage 
to the respondent. This argument was fully answered 
by the Court's decision of December 31st. Nothing 
daunted, the appellant tries again, this time on still 
another tack; namely, th!at respondents are not en-
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titled to relief because respondents use of the words 
''Security Title" is not exclusive. Appellant also urges 
that to grant to respondents the protection sought, is 
giving them a monopoly on the use of these words 
"Security Title". Fortunately, all of these argu-
ments were made to the lower Court, and included 
with changing emphasis, as above pointed out, in 
the argument on appeal before this court. 
Point number 1 of the appellant's argument on 
the petition for rehearing was included in point 
number 1 of the Reply Brief, an'd particularly at 
pages 5 and 6 thereof where the Fisk case was dis-
cussed at length and it was urged by appellant upon 
the Court that, "In short, the plaintiffs, at the trial 
would have had to den1onstrate that the words 'Sec-
urity Title' have been used exclusively." The fact 
that respondents had affiliated corporations using 
the words "Security Ti tie" in Utah was not only 
pointed out to this Coutt, but in the opinion filed, 
this Court took official cognizance of this fact. It 
was not "'overlooked" as the appellant stated in its 
point number 1 of the brief for r~hearing. We cite 
the Court's opinion, 
"Former employees and associates of 
respondents are now doing land title examina-
tions, abstracting and acting as agents for 
ti tie insurance companies in various counties 
within this state as affiliates of respondents 
and have been given the ri.ght b~ r~s~onden~s 
tu use the words 'Secunty Title In their 
nan1es." 
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The Fisk case, 3 F2d 7, was argued fully to 
'the Court in appell:ant's Reply Brief and in the oral 
argument before this Court. It a:hd the cases cited 
with it by appellant do not stand for the proposi-
tion contended for by appellant, ·as has been pre-
viously argued :at length to this Court, and nothing 
new i's here presented by appellant for the Court's 
consideration. 
Appellant's second point in fue brief for re-
hearing· is nothing but a rehash of the exact point 
argued as the second sub-point of point number 1 
of the appellant's Reply Brief. We direct the Court's 
a:tten tion to the similarity of the language in which 
the two points are set out. In the Reply Brief. at 
page 5, the appellant says, 
"2. Even if -a secondary meaning. had 
attached ·to the words 'Security Title' in favor 
of the plaintiffs or either of them (assuming 
such could occur) the plaintiffs would not 
thereby have an exclusive monopolistic right 
to· the ·use of such words, but would merely 
have a right to complain of an unfair use 
thereof by another.'' 
In the instant brief for rehearing, the point is 
.set forth by appellant in this language, 
· "Contrary to well established l:aw, which 
would only entitle the plaintiffs to a rig:ht.to 
have a subsequent user of the words distin-
guish itself, this court in affirming the de-
cision of the trial court has inadvertently 
granted the plaintiffs .an unwarranted mon-
opolistic right to the use of the words 'Secur-
ity Title'." 
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We submit that ·nothing new is placed before tlle 
Court for consideration in this point. 
Appellant, throughout the case, has been unable 
or unwilling to perceive the distinction between 
trademarks and the property right a corporation 
has in its corporate name. The cases cited in appel-
lant's brief on rehearing are for the most part trade-
mark cases, some of which are dependent upon :ap-
lication of statutes regulating the use of the trade-
marks for the decisions reached. They have no per-
tinency here. The Supreme Court of the United 
States, in the case of American Steel Foundries v. 
Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 70 L.Ed. 317, marks the 
distinction: 
" ... There is no property in a tflademark 
apart from· the business or trade in connec-
tion with which it is employed. Unite'd Drug 
Co. v. Theodore Reetanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 
9'7, 63 L.ed. 141, 14·5; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48; 
Hanover Star Mill. Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 
403, 413, 414, 60 L.ed. 713, 718, 7'1'9, 36 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 3'5 7. ~The 1la w of trademarks is but a 
part of the broader law of unfair ·competi-
.tion' (ibid.), the general purpose of whi~h is 
to prevent one person from passing ,off his 
goods or his business as tilie goods or business 
of another. 
"Whether the name of a corporation is 
to· he regarded as a trademark, a trade name, 
or both, is not entirely clear under the deci-
sions. To some extent the two terms overlap, 
but there is a difference more or less definite-
ly recognized, which is, that, generally- spe_ak-
ing, the former is applicable to .the~ ven'drble 
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commodity to which it is affixed, the latter to 
a business and its good will. See Ball v. Broad-
way Bazaar, 194 N.Y. 4·2'9, 434, 435, 87 N.E. 
6'74. A corporate name seems to f.all more ap-
P!Opri~tely into _the latter class. Bu~ the pre-
cise difference Is not often material, since 
1fue law affords protection ~against its appro-
priation in either view upon the same funda-
mental principles. 'The effect of assuming a 
·corporate name by a corporation under the 
law of its creation i's to exclusively appropri-
ate that name. It is an element of the corpor-
ation's exis'tence. Newby v. Oregon C. R. Co., 
Deady 609, 616, Fed. Cas. No. 10,144. And~ 
as Judge Deady said in that case: 
"'Any act which produces confusion or 
uncertainty concerning this name is well cal-
culated to injuriously affect the identity and 
business of :a corporation. And as a matter of 
fact, in some degree at least, the natural and 
necessary consequence of the wrongful appro-
priation of a corporate name, is to injure the 
business and rights of the corporation by de-
stroying or confusing its identity.' 
"The general doctrine is that equity not 
only will enjoin the appropriation and use 
of a trade-mark or trade name where it is 
completely identical with the name of the cor-
poration, but will enjoin such appropriation 
and use where the resembl~ance is so close as 
to be likely to produce confusion as to suc~1 
identity, to the injury of the corporation t~ 
which the name belongs. Cape May Yacht 
Club v. Cape May Yacht & Country Club, 81 
N. J. Eq. 4'54, 458, 86 Atl. 972; Armington 
v. Palmer, 21 R.I. 109, 115, 43 L.R.A. 95, 79 
Am. St. Rep. 786, 42 Atl. 308. Judicial inter-
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ference will depend upon the facts proved and 
found in each case. Hendricks v. Man'tagu, 
L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 638, 648-C.A.; Chas. S. 
Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N.Y. 
4612, 469-4 71, 4 71, 27 L.R.A. 42, 4'3 Am. St. 
Rep. 769, 39 N.E. 490." 
That a corporate name is a valuable property 
right of the corporation entitled to prote'ction by 
the courts is recognized by Fletcher Cyclopedia of 
Corporations, Volume 6, Permanent Edition, Section 
2415, a:t page '7, where the author says, 
''In any case it is regarded, to a certain 
extent, as a property right and one which can-
not be impaired or defeated by subsequent 
appropriation by another corpor.ation operat-
ing in the same field . . . " 
This Court, in previously rendered decisions, 
has decisively declared the basis for a rehearing. 
In the case of Ducheneau v. House, Sup. Ct. 
of Utah July 3, 1886, 4 'U. 483, 11 P. H18, this court 
said: 
"The petition for rehearing states no 
new facts or grounds for a reversal of the 
judgment of the lower court. It is mainly are-
argument of the case. We have repeatedly 
called attention to the fact that no rehearing 
will be granted where nothing new and im-
portant is offered for our consideration. We 
again say that we cannot grant a rehearing 
unless a strong showing therefor be ma'de. A 
re-argument, or an argument with the Court 
upon the points of the decision, with no new 
light given, is not such a showing. The re-
hearing is denied." 
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Again in Cummings et ~tx v. Nielson, et al, 42 
U. 157, 1'29 P. 619. 
''We desire to 1add a word in conclusion 
respecting the numerous applications for re-
hearings in this court. To make an applica-
tion for a rehearing is a matter of right, and 
we have no desire to discourage the practice 
of filing petitions for rehearings in proper 
cases. When this court, however, has con-
sidered and decided 'all of the material ques-
tions invdlved in a case, a rehearing should 
not be applied for, unless we have miscon-
strued or overlooked some material fact or 
facts, or have over looked some statute or de-
cision which may affect the result, or that 
we have based the decision on some wrong 
principle of law, or have either misapplied 
or overlooked something which materially af-
fects the result. In this case nothing was done 
or attempted by counsel, except to re-argue 
the very propositions we had fully considered 
and decided. If we shoU'ld write opinions on 
all the petitions for rehearings filed, we would 
have to devote a very large portion of our 
time in answering counsel's contentions a 
second '~ime; and, if we should grant rehear-
ings because they are demanded, we should 
do nothing else save to write and rewrite 
opinions in a few cases. Let it again be said 
that it is 'Conceded, as a rna tter of course that 
we ~annot convince losing counsel that their 
contentions should not prevail, but in m!aking 
this concession let it also be remembered that 
we, and not counsel must ultimately assume 
all responsibility with respect to whether our 
conclusions are sound or unsound. Our en-
deavor is to determine all cases correctly upon 
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the law and the facts, and, if we fail in this, 
it is because we are incapable of arriving at 
just conclusions. As a general rule, therefore, 
merely to re..:argue the grounds originally pre-
sented can be of little, if any, aid to us. If 
there are some reasons, however, such as we 
have indi'cated above, or other good reasons, a 
petition for rehearing should be promptly 
filed, and if it is meri torlous, its form will 
in no case be scrutinized by the Court. 
"There is no merit to the present petition, 
and it is, therefore, 1denied.'' 
As we have previously pointed out, in the pre-
sent petition for rehearing, counsel for appellant, 
by change of emphasis, seeks to make that which has 
been extensively argued to the Court before, no\V 
appear as new. This is not true and the previously 
entered decision of this Court is sound, workable law 
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CONCLUSION 
The petition for rehearing is merely an argu-
ment with the Court's decision, and presents no 
basis upon which a rehearing should be granted. We 
submit that the petition of appellant for rehearing 
should be denied. 
Res,pectful'ly submitted, 
, ALLEN H. TIBBALS AND 
EARL P. STATEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs & Respondents 
By --------------------------- ~---------------------------.----
ALLAN H. TIBBALS 
604 El Paso Natural Ga'S Building 
3t5 East Second South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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